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The debate between diseasemodels of addiction andmoral or voluntarist models has been
endless, and often echoes the equally endless debate between determinism and free will.
I suggest here that part of the problem comes from how we picture the function of moti-
vation in self-control. Quantitative experiments in both humans and non-humans have
shown that delayed reward loses its effectiveness in proportion to its delay. The resulting
instability of preference is best controlled by a recursive self-prediction process, intertem-
poral bargaining, which is the likely mechanism of both the strength and the experienced
freedom of will. In this model determinism is consistent with more elements of free will
than compatibilist philosophers have heretofore proposed, and personal responsibility is
an inseparable, functional component of will. Judgments of social responsibility can be
described as projections of personal responsibility, but normative responsibility in addic-
tion is elusive.The cited publications that are under the author’s control can be downloaded
from www.picoeconomics.org.
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Many factors promote the impulse for an addictive activity. In
addition to social and informational differences between individu-
als, the differential attractiveness of such activity is associated with
heritable differences in the highs people get from a given activity,
differences in their inborn tendency to discount delayed rewards,
and adaptation of their brain reward structures to repeated addic-
tive activity (1). Prior factors that have increased the differential
reward for addictive activities – even the self-inflicted adaptation
factor – could be said to have created a disease, in that the person’s
current level of temptation is not subject to voluntary control.
Eczema is called a disease, after all, even though the involuntary
process is the itching, whereas voluntary scratching is what does
the damage. However, discovery of the physical roots of tempta-
tion should not obscure the process of motivated choice that is
never bypassed in addiction.
Addiction is sometimes identified with physiological patterns
such as intoxication, tolerance, and withdrawal, regardless of how
the person values them. However, the kind of addiction that a per-
son complains of has two essential elements: temporary preference
for inferior rewards, and failure to forestall the recurrent surren-
der to this preference. The first element arises from the universal
over-valuation of imminent rewards, which will produce tempo-
rary preferences for them to the extent that the person does not
compensate for it. It has been suggested that this over-valuation
represents just the arousal of appetites or emotions (2), but a
more fundamental pattern is now well documented (3–5). Peo-
ple have inherited a hyperbolic delay discount function from our
non-human ancestors:
Present value = Value0
/ [
1+ (k × Delay)]
where Value0= value if immediate and k is degree of impatience.
This function makes the value of an event inversely propor-
tional to its expected delay, which means that many objectively
smaller sooner (SS) rewards will tend to be temporarily preferred
to larger later (LL) alternatives when the SS rewards are immi-
nent (Figure 1). The hyperbolic shape of the value/delay function
probably survived natural selection because it is a basic psy-
chophysical relation, the same as that for sensory perceptions such
as brightness and heaviness (6). In species where instinct generates
present reward for future-oriented tasks (hoarding, dam-building,
migrating. . .) this shape is probably not maladaptive, but it gives
humans a temptation problem.
Modern people are set up for addictions at birth. Since Isaac
Marks’ seminal article (7) many activities have been identified as
addictive without the involvement of substances, or even external
rewards. Analysis of hyperbolic discounting suggests how the great
human ability to coin reward by imagination can be channeled
into addictive temptations, by patterns of outcomes that serve as
occasions for reward but that make no prediction at all of exter-
nal rewarding events, as in video games (8). What differentiates
the addict from her neighbor is not the strong temptation, when
close up, to seek options that she would avoid from a distance.
Rather it is the collapse of her resistance to this temptation. This is
the other essential element of addiction. We normally reach com-
promises with our urges, and set boundaries to our bad habits.
Understanding this failure – indeed understanding why “compro-
mise”is the right word – will be key to understanding responsibility
in addiction.
RECURSIVE SELF-PREDICTION
Motivation for impulse control comes from the value described by
the hyperbolic discount function at long delays, which is propor-
tional to objective value when both alternatives are distant – and
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FIGURE 1 | Hyperbolic curves describing the values of a smaller, sooner
(SS) reward and a larger, later (LL) reward as the delay before they will
be available decreases. An early choice (near the left edge) would favor the
LL reward, but a choice when the pair is close would favor the SS reward.
much higher for each than is described by either conventional
exponential or “quasi-hyperbolic” (cue-driven) functions (9). The
need to adopt protections for long term plans is unique to humans,
and the number of these that the new human species has been able
to learn has been limited: to some extent a person can avoid paths
that take her close to SS alternatives, or she can avoid revaluation
of them when close, but these strategies will necessarily be hard to
maintain for long periods. Alternatively she can set up incentives,
especially social ones, that will add deterrence at crucial moments.
However, I have argued that a great part of impulse control in an
individualistic society is accomplished by the person’s perception
that large future benefits depend on regular choices of a particular
kind – such as not to drink, spend, or play too much – and that
each current choice is a test case for the choices she can expect
future selves to make (4, 9). Such self-prediction creates a poten-
tially strong but somewhat rigid mechanism of impulse control,
willpower, without the need for a separate organ or faculty. The
person can then afford to live closer to temptations, although her
self-control will be at risk from her thinking of reasons that a
future self should not count a present indulgence as a lapse – that
is, from rationalizations.
The person will see a current abstinence as worth the effort
if and only if this is necessary to maintain a credible pattern of
abstinence, a perception that organizes her relevant choices into a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma – or self-enforcing contract – where
a current defection jeopardizes future cooperation. The devil is
in the word “relevant.” If the person can see how a current con-
sumption should not change her future expectation – “today is
special” – then she may get to enjoy it without damaging her long
term prospects. Auditioning rationales for their credibility and
modifying them accordingly is a recursive, often rapid process. If
successful, it maintains the compromise between urges and long
term expectations. Rationalizations may not be especially risky
when the stakes are low (“I resolve to clean my room today”), but
the risk becomes demonstrable when large amounts of incentive
hinge on the test, as when a recovering alcoholic decides to try
drinking just once. This plan is apt to follow the same logic as the
decision of a party to a self-enforcing contract to cheat her partner;
defection by a current self often leads to the notorious abstinence
violation effect (10; for dieters, see 11). Such a sudden loss of
control after a single lapse has sometimes been blamed on a phys-
ical stimulation of appetite; however, when alcoholic volunteers
are given either alcohol punch or an indistinguishable placebo,
the belief that they have had alcohol leads to craving whereas the
alcohol itself does not (12).
EVIDENCE OF RECURSIVE SELF-PREDICTION IN WILL
Recursive (fed-back) processes are notoriously hard to experiment
on, even in physical systems (e.g., 13, pp. 191–211), let alone
motivational ones, a difficulty which may have concealed their
prevalence. Recursive self-prediction is most evident in common
intuitions about the motivational consequence of a single lapse in
a diet or sobriety, as above, which are sharpened in thought prob-
lems such as Kavka’s, Monterosso’s, and Newcomb’s (14). There
have been some suggestive experiments: pointing out to subjects
that their current choice in a series of SS/LL reward choices may
be predictive of their future preferences raises their frequency of
LL choices, although not as much as does obligatory commitment
for the whole series with their first choice (15, 16). The intertem-
poral bargaining model fits the properties of will specified by the
early psychologists who analyzed will (4, pp. 79–80, 117–120), and
predicts the behavior of subjects in 2- and N -person prisoner’s
dilemma analogs (4, pp. 90–94; 17). However, given that intertem-
poral bargaining depends on intrapsychic contingencies, we might
hope for better evidence from brain imaging.
Unfortunately, imaging experience is rudimentary. Using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Luo et al., found that
equal preference between a LL reward and a SS alternative can-
not be predicted from the activity in brain reward centers when
those alternatives are offered singly, outside of the choice situation
(18). After establishing a behavioral indifference point, subjects
were given chances to respond for each outcome separately. They
showed less activity in their reward centers for what had been the
LL rewards than for the erstwhile SS rewards, even though they had
been indifferent when choosing between these rewards, and were
still indifferent when the choice contingency was offered again.
That is, the mere establishment of a choice contingency changes
the relative value of SS and LL outcomes, in favor of the LL one.
The implication is that when impulse control is relevant, moti-
vation beyond what arises from the current rewards themselves
must be active. In other studies the lateral frontal cortex has been
found to be more active when a subject makes LL choices (e.g., 19),
but a recent experiment raises a question of whether this activity
is tracking motivation for those LL choices. Luo et al. observed
individual subjects’ stochasticity (variability) of SS/LL choice over
time (20). By finding the ratio of SS to LL amount that produced
equal preference, and then offering differing amounts in the same
ratio at the same alternative delays, it was possible in effect to
offer a subject the same choice repeatedly in a way that the sub-
ject would not recognize, and thus to observe small, spontaneous
variations over trials of SS vs. LL preference. Lateral frontal corti-
cal activity was indeed often greater with LL choice, but mostly in
subjects who showed relatively great stochasticity – the ones who
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wavered most. This somewhat counterintuitive finding suggests
that activity in lateral frontal cortical “executive centers” may not
reflect preference for LL alternatives per se, but perhaps represents
a response by which subjects compensate for a perceived unrelia-
bility of such preference. These studies are far from definitive, but
they suggest that self-control in SS/LL choices may be determined
by processes on at least two levels above the spontaneous valuation
of rewards that is seen in non-choice designs: mental effort, possi-
bly reflected in lateral frontal cortical activity; and a non-effortful
evaluative process in which the most stable long term preferences
are established – possibly by intertemporal bargaining – which
so far lacks fMRI correlates. It may be significant that subjects
with relatively great ventromedial prefrontal cortical activity when
imagining future selves also prefer LL rewards relatively more than
do other subjects (21), but the role of such “prospection” centers
in self-control has not been explored.
FREEDOM OF WILL
Assuming that recursive self-prediction is the basis of will, what
are the implications for addicts’ responsibility? Intertemporal bar-
gaining increases the power of self-control but also its potential
volatility. A recovering alcoholic may notice that she is procrasti-
nating about an unrelated issue and interpret that as evidence of
her will being weaker than she thought, which may in turn reduce
her expectation of staying sober. That reduction may motivate
increased rigidity to prove she is strong, or it may snowball into
expectations that are too greatly lowered for their peril to deter
a drinking episode. The potential for small or merely symbolic
choices to shift much larger motives gives the will an element
of chaos, in the technical sense (13). Whatever awareness of this
process a person has acquired is apt to weigh on every choice that
she notices to be evidence of her predilections. This extra motiva-
tion provides a rationale for strength of will – and also, arguably,
for a mechanism that meets common definitions of freedom of
will.
As characterized by Richard Holton, people’s insistence on the
freedom of will largely stems from two kinds of experience: the
unpredictability of one’s own behavior (“For all I know, I might
have done otherwise”) and the initiation of one’s behavior (“Action
is experienced as something that the agent instigates, rather than
something that just happens to the agent as the result of the state
that they were antecedently in” – 22). We do not feel as if we are
passively responding to the incentives we detect. Chaotic systems
such as weather have been proposed as models for the unpre-
dictability of our choices (23), but critics have pointed out that
being buffeted by the weather would not feel like being free, more
like having seizures (24, p. 231). However, the feeding back of
tentative choices to the process of choice itself makes the agent a
participant in her motivational weather. In a simple linear choice I
might decide how much food to take at a buffet lunch on the basis
of how hungry I am or how long I expect to go without food in
the afternoon. But if I am a restricted eater those considerations
may be overshadowed by estimating whether the food I take looks
like I am lapsing, and knowing that the prospect of lapsing may
increase my hunger. [Recursive self-prediction as a cause of “con-
ditioned” (cue-driven) appetite is discussed in 5, pp. 222–229].
The latter, recursive estimation is of the same cognitive kind as
the linear, but the sensation that my making estimates is changing
those estimates as I make them has an added quality. Choosing
under the influence of the choice itself pulls attention back from
the ostensible alternatives to an inward dialog, one that should
produce a feeling of agency at the same time that it makes choice
unpredictable from its original incentives. The outcome is still
strictly determined, of course, but recursively rather than linearly,
a distinction that keeps the self from being that old bugbear of
determinism, a throughput – a mere conveyor of incentives (fuller
discussion in 25).
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDICTIVE CHOICES
Much of the effort that has gone into finding rationales for free will
stems from its supposed necessity for holding people responsible
for their choices (26). A theory that derives the functional proper-
ties of free will from recursive self-prediction is still deterministic,
and thus does not seem at first to be a solution. However, the
way that this theory relates strength to freedom of will suggests a
functional framework for responsibility without indeterminacy –
and thus a space in which the voluntarist model of addiction
can be valid. Rather than testing this possibility by the truth or
falsehood of determinism, it makes more sense for us to look
at the practical roots of responsibility. Psychology has generally
assumed that a personal sense of responsibility comes from inter-
nalization of pressure that is brought to bear by parents and other
socializers, but with the logic of intertemporal bargaining their
precepts cease to be needed to provide incentive, only to suggest
compromises between internal interests. A serious lapse threatens
such compromises, not because the person makes a decision to
punish herself but because of the realistic fall in her expectation
of future self-control. (This model is not contradicted by social
psychology experiments in which subjects who read statements
espousing determinism subsequently indulge in minor antisocial
behaviors – see 22.)
Personal responsibility is thus an operational component of
will. Its inseparability from volition raises the possibility that when
people judge someone else to be guilty, they are projecting their
own experience with lapses – feeling personal guilt empathically:
“If I were in her shoes, I would feel guilty.”That is, our understand-
ing of other people’s responsibility comes from our intuition of
our own. Such a process would supply the element of deserving-
ness that is missing from determinist models that explain social
responsibility as a manipulation to create deterrence, which are
intuitively unsatisfying (27). Thus for both personal and social
responsibility, the truth of determinism is not relevant (discussed
in 25). However, the question remains of how responsibility is
affected by addiction.
An addict undeniably faces disease factors, but my argument is
that they operate through motivation, not instead of it. Addiction
becomes “hopeless” when the addict has no rationale by which
abstention at crucial choice points would sufficiently increase the
believability of her future sobriety. As described above, such belief
is sensitively dependent on many self-generated signs and sym-
bols, but at some point the addict has tried and spoiled all the
ones she can think of. She is not sick in the sense of being beyond
motivation, but her inability to propose any credible intertempo-
ral deal constitutes a kind of bankruptcy, and she could be argued
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thus not to be responsible – except that, unlike a financial bank-
rupt, she sometimes has a sudden epiphany that re-orders her
accounts (28). The advice of the Anonymous organizations that
the addict is helpless against her addiction does not imply the
irrelevance of intertemporal bargaining, but rather the danger
of trying rationalizations where the bargaining is full of mis-
trust. Their injunction to resolve sobriety for only 1 day at a
time aims at restarting the bargaining process with a low level
of trust. To acknowledge helplessness against a temptation with-
out attempting to renounce it forever sounds illogical, but it
is often the only successful compromise after long histories of
grand resolution and total collapse. These organizations have intu-
ited most of the tactics that an intertemporal bargaining model
would prescribe (which is not to argue for or against their clinical
effectiveness).
CONCLUSION
As is the case with so many ancient debates, both the dis-
ease theory and the moral theory of addiction have part of
the truth on their side. The physical roots of addictive temp-
tation are increasingly known, as is their unequal distribution
among individuals and within the same individual at different
points in her addictive history. In her current moment forces
gathered by heredity, exposure, and even her own past behav-
ior are givens, and could fairly be judged to constitute a disease.
However, their force is still one of temptation, even when giv-
ing in promises only a joyless oblivion instead of the pain of
short-lived self-control. The error of policy-makers who rely on
negative incentives is not their belief that addictive behavior is
motivated, but their miscalculation of how much punishment
can make up for the bankruptcy of a person’s intertemporal bar-
gaining process. Unless they have experienced such bankruptcy
themselves, trying to put themselves in the addict’s shoes leads
them to conclude that she just needs an extra push, whereas in
fact she needs to re-establish a relationship with her prospec-
tive future selves. Certainly cures for temptation itself can be a
factor – for instance, buprenorphine for opiate craving – as can
simply structuring modest incentives with a view toward imme-
diacy and reliability (e.g., 29). And certainly, blanket forgiveness
of bad deeds that have sprung from an addiction would create
perverse incentives, “moral hazard.” But beyond these straight-
forward contingencies, the difference between sobriety and ruin
often lies with the turnings of intertemporal bargaining, which
defy simplification.
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